contracts · reviews · signed releases
Security
Polysia never holds merchant funds. This page lists the contracts, what has been reviewed so far, how releases are signed and how to report a vulnerability.
Contracts
| Contract | Polygon PoS mainnet |
|---|---|
| PolysiaFactory (production) | not deployed yet It will be deployed after a professional audit, owned by the Polysia multisig (Safe), with verified source on Polygonscan. The address will be published here — use only the address on this page. |
| USDT (USDT0) — the token Polysia accepts | 0xc2132D05D31c914a87C6611C10748AEb04B58e8F |
Design: one immutable factory. Every payment address is a minimal proxy (CREATE2) that only the factory can flush. Sweeps are permissionless and pay the business's own Hot Wallet; the platform fee is computed and paid on-chain in the same transaction. Fee-recipient and Hot Wallet changes are two-step; operator fee increases have a 3-day timelock.
Reviews so far
Contract tests
Foundry unit, fuzz and invariant suites, plus forked-mainnet tests against the real USDT0 token. Slither static analysis and Halmos symbolic checks.
Automated and AI-assisted reviews
Automated audit scans and independent AI-assisted reviews of each contract version. Every accepted finding was fixed with a regression test; remaining accepted risks are documented. These are not a professional audit.
Gateway findings fixed
One internal and two external (AI-assisted) reviews of the API, payment pages and webhooks: 2 high, 9 medium and 11 low/info findings reproduced with failing tests and fixed; one report could not be reproduced (hardened anyway).
Professional audit
Planned before the production deployment. The report will be linked here.
Release signing
Releases and updates are signed with an Ed25519 release key. Its private half exists only as a passphrase-encrypted file (argon2id) and is used offline. The public key is built into Polysia and into install.sh; an install refuses anything not signed by it and never installs an older version.
Public keys
Compare the fingerprint before you trust a download. These are public keys — safe to share.
Release signing key
Signs the release checksums (SHA256SUMS) and every update manifest. Built into polysiad and install.sh.
| Key id | prod-release-2026-a |
|---|---|
| Algorithm | Ed25519 |
| Public key (base64) | x+ukyms0qbrhW8V7cNBs4DIK6m7jH2Ant47FoneK/L8= |
| Fingerprint (SHA-256 of the DER key, base64) | SHA256:Ac0hXUeZL373OCiQmq6ffbDf9MWkqOiOiQDxfx/a3Ro= |
-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
MCowBQYDK2VwAyEAx+ukyms0qbrhW8V7cNBs4DIK6m7jH2Ant47FoneK/L8=
-----END PUBLIC KEY-----Activation server key
Signs activation tokens and security notices from activation.polysia.io. It cannot sign releases — Polysia refuses a release key on that server.
| Key id | prod-activation-2026-a |
|---|---|
| Algorithm | Ed25519 |
| Public key (base64) | uwRPR5Qf4XIov7WfYRyW5xGh2/t+MZ46zwvG6NqgRtM= |
| Fingerprint (SHA-256 of the DER key, base64) | SHA256:d2d3xa89TMl/Vd1AYaLvbQVOvZCxT8b6QSFoP1ym3LA= |
-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
MCowBQYDK2VwAyEAuwRPR5Qf4XIov7WfYRyW5xGh2/t+MZ46zwvG6NqgRtM=
-----END PUBLIC KEY-----Verify a download yourself
install.sh runs these checks automatically before it installs anything. To repeat them by hand on Linux:
# 1. install.sh, the checksums and their signature (for a pre-release use .../releases/download/<tag>)
B=https://github.com/polysiaio/polysia-releases/releases/latest/download
curl -fsSL -O $B/install.sh -O $B/SHA256SUMS -O $B/SHA256SUMS.sig
curl -fsSL -o polysia-release.pem https://polysia.io/polysia-release.pem
# 2. the key fingerprint must be the one on this page
openssl pkey -pubin -in polysia-release.pem -outform DER | openssl dgst -sha256 -binary | base64
# 3. signature first, then the checksums
base64 -d SHA256SUMS.sig > SHA256SUMS.sig.bin
openssl pkeyutl -verify -pubin -inkey polysia-release.pem -rawin -in SHA256SUMS -sigfile SHA256SUMS.sig.bin
sha256sum -c --ignore-missing SHA256SUMS
# 4. the key inside install.sh is the same key
grep -A2 'BEGIN PUBLIC KEY' install.shExpected: the fingerprint above, Signature Verified Successfully and OK for every file. Anything else: do not install, and write to [email protected].
Updates: polysiad verifies every update manifest with the same built-in key, refuses older versions and checks each binary's SHA-256 before it replaces the running one; a failed start rolls back automatically.
Report a vulnerability
E-mail [email protected] with steps to reproduce. Please do not open a public issue. We answer within 3 working days and credit reporters who wish to be named.

